Virginia Reckless Driving

Virginia Reckless Driving Defense Lawyer

In Virginia, Reckless driving is classified as a class 1 misdemeanor carrying a potential maximum of one year in jail, $2,500.00 in fines, and potentially a suspension of your driver’s license.

Virginia Reckless driving is a serious charge.  Counting on the knowledge of an experienced, high quality Virginia reckless driving defense attorney is extremely important to protect your freedom, your finances, and even your privilege to drive in Virginia.

A Virginia reckless driving lawyer will aggressively defend your case.  As your Virginia attorney, our firm will verify that the device used to measure your speed and the methods used to measure your speed, whether radar, laser, or pace, complies with all the statutory requirements.  If a requirement is not met, we will aggressively fight to have the Virginia reckless driving charge dismissed.

A Virginia reckless driving defense attorney also understands that sometimes you may need to negotiate an outcome for your Virginia reckless driving charge.  There are times when a good defense lawyer’s job is to make a bad situation better.  As such, we are experienced in resolving reckless driving charges… sometimes a reduction to speeding, improper driving, defective equipment, failure to obey a highway sign, or other similar resolution is appropriate for your Virginia reckless driving ticket… Sometimes it’s best to fight…. We will provide you with candid legal advice and you will have the last word on whether to resolve or go to trial for your Virginia reckless driving charge.

The most common forms of reckless driving in Virginia are:

Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from speeding 20+ over the posted speed limit or speeding over 80 mph in Virginia

This is perhaps the most frequently charged variety of Virginia reckless driving.  Many of our clients are initially shocked to discover that although they were traveling with the flow of traffic and even going at a slower speed than other vehicles, they were still caught driving in excess of 80 mph and charged with reckless driving.

§ 46.2-862. Exceeding speed limit – A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth (i) at a speed of twenty miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit where the applicable speed limit is thirty miles per hour or less, (ii) at a speed of sixty miles per hour or more where the applicable maximum speed limit is thirty-five miles per hour, (iii) at a speed of twenty miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limits where the applicable maximum speed limit is forty miles per hour or more, or (iv) in excess of eighty miles per hour regardless of the applicable maximum speed limit

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from driving recklessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property in Virginia

§ 46.2-852. Reckless driving; general rule – Irrespective of the maximum speeds permitted by law, any person who drives a vehicle on any highway recklessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person shall be guilty of reckless driving.

But how does the Virginia Code define the degree of negligence required to support a reckless driving conviction in Virginia?  What if an accident occurs?  Are the happening of an accident, intoxication, or careless driving sufficient to rise to the level of recklessness required to support a conviction for reckless driving in Virginia?  The Virginia Court of Appeals had an opportunity to address some of these issues.

501 S.E.2d 438

27 Va.App. 720

Henry Adolphus THOMPSON
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 1498-97-3.

Court of Appeals of Virginia,
Salem.

July 7, 1998.

Page 439

[27 Va.App. 722] Margaret A. Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: BRAY, OVERTON and BUMGARDNER, JJ.

BRAY, Judge.

Henry Adolphus Thompson (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial for reckless driving and feloniously driving after having been adjudicated an habitual offender, violations of Code §§ 46.2-852 and 46.2-357(B)(2), respectively. On appeal, defendant complains that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. We agree and reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Under familiar principles, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975).

On January 1, 1997, Lynchburg Police Officer M.R. Gillispie was dispatched to a single car accident at 12th and Federal Streets. Upon arrival, Gillispie found an automobile crashed into a utility pole and medical personnel treating a passenger for “severe head injuries.” Neither the driver nor other occupants of the vehicle were at the scene, but Gillispie soon learned that another officer had detained a suspect a “couple blocks from the accident.” Gillispie proceeded immediately to that location and encountered defendant, bleeding from a “visible cut to his face and nose and … complaining of chest pain,” injuries “consistent with the crushed steering wheel and the face print on the driver’s side windshield.” Gillispie also observed that defendant’s eyes were “glassy,” he was “unsteady on his feet,” and emitted “a strong odor of alcohol.” [27 Va.App. 723] When defendant was unable to successfully perform a series of field sobriety tests, Gillispie arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol. 1

Subsequent to arrest, defendant stated he drove the vehicle at the time of the accident, “because the others were too drunk,” and “had been an habitual offender for about ten years.” Although he denied drinking alcohol after the accident, defendant admitted consuming “about four beers and two shots of liquor” sometime previously, at an unnamed location on Federal Street.

At trial, the court, after accepting defendant’s guilty plea to leaving the scene of the accident in violation of Code § 46.2-894, convicted him upon pleas of not guilty to reckless driving and felonious endangerment by an habitual offender, the instant offenses. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the latter convictions.

I. Reckless Driving

Code § 46.2-852 provides, in pertinent part, that “any person who drives a vehicle on any highway recklessly or at a speed in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person shall be

Page 440

guilty of reckless driving.” Code § 46.2-852. “The word ‘recklessly’ as used in the statute imparts a disregard by the driver of a motor vehicle for the consequences of his act and an indifference to the safety of life, limb or property.” Powers v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 386, 388, 177 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1970). “The essence of the offense … lies not in the act of operating a vehicle, but in the manner and circumstances of its operation.” Id.; Hall v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 352, 355, 488 S.E.2d 651, 653 [27 Va.App. 724] 1997). Thus, “[t]he mere happening of an accident does not give rise to an inference of reckless driving.” Powers, 211 Va. at 388, 177 S.E.2d at 630. To convict, the Commonwealth must “prove every essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,” with evidence which excludes “every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and … consistent only with … guilt….” Id. at 388, 177 S.E.2d at 629.

In Hall, we considered the import of intoxication evidence in a prosecution for reckless driving. Hall was discovered by police ” ‘passed out’ behind the wheel” of an automobile stopped in a heavily traveled roadway, with “ignition switch and headlights … on and … indicator lights … illuminated.” Hall smelled of alcohol, was confused, unsteady, slurred in speech and admitted “driving” the vehicle. However, the record was silent with respect to the “manner and circumstances” of Hall’s driving. Hall, 25 Va.App. at 355, 488 S.E.2d at 653. Guided by Powers, we concluded that such “circumstances … do not give rise to an inference that [defendant] drove … in a reckless manner.” Id. In reversing the conviction, the panel noted that ” ‘evidence of intoxication is a factor that might bear upon proof of dangerousness or reckless driving in a given case,’ ” but ” ‘does not, of itself, prove reckless driving.’ ‘ “One may be both drunk and reckless … [or] reckless though not drunk …[, or] under the influence of intoxicants and yet drive carefully.” ‘ ” Id. at 355 n. 3, 488 S.E.2d at 653 n. 3 (quoting Bishop v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 206, 210, 455 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1995)).

Here, assuming, without deciding, that the evidence proved defendant had been driving the car while intoxicated at the time of the collision, it establishes little else. The record does not disclose the time of the accident, the manner in which defendant drove the car, his blood alcohol level, the road conditions, weather, traffic controls, or other circumstances probative of a Code § 46.2-852 violation. Reckless driving is not a status offense, and defendant cannot be convicted upon “speculation and conjecture as to what caused [him] to lose [27 Va.App. 725] control of the car.” Powers, 211 Va. at 389, 177 S.E.2d at 630. Thus, under the instant facts, we find the evidence insufficient to support a conviction for reckless driving. 2

II. Habitual Offender Endangerment

Code § 46.2-357(B)(2) elevates driving by an habitual offender from a misdemeanor to a felony when “such driving … of itself endangers the life, limb, or property of another,” Code § 46.2-357 (emphasis added), “language virtually identical to that found in the statute defining reckless driving.” Bishop, 20 Va.App. at 211, 455 S.E.2d at 767; Code § 46.2-852. Hence, we also find the evidence insufficient to support a finding of felonious habitual offender endangerment and reverse the conviction. However, because the record clearly establishes that defendant violated Code § 46.2-357(B)(1), the misdemeanor offense, we remand for further proceedings, if the Commonwealth be so advised. Gorham v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 673, 678-79, 426 S.E.2d 493, 497 (1993).

Reversed and remanded.

—————

1 Defendant was found not guilty of driving under the influence by the general district court. Although evidence of intoxication was presented during the instant trial for reckless driving, the record does not disclose defendant’s blood alcohol content, and the trial court did not find that he was intoxicated either at the time of the accident or arrest.

2 The Commonwealth mistakenly relies upon Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 1 Va.App. 469, 339 S.E.2d 905 (1986), as support for the inference that proof of defendant’s intoxication sufficiently explained the accident. In Kennedy, the evidence clearly supported the inference that the accused “fell asleep at the wheel,” resulting in a collision. Id. at 472, 339 S.E.2d at 907. Manifestly, driving a vehicle while sleeping evinces the disregard for the life, limb and property contemplated by Code § 46.2-852.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from passing a stopped school bus

§ 46.2-859. Passing a stopped school bus; prima facie evidence – A person is guilty of reckless driving who fails to stop, when approaching from any direction, any school bus which is stopped on any highway, private road or school driveway for the purpose of taking on or discharging children, the elderly, or mentally or physically handicapped persons, and to remain stopped until all the persons are clear of the highway, private road or school driveway and the bus is put in motion. The driver of a vehicle, however, need not stop when approaching a school bus if the school bus is stopped on the other roadway of a divided highway, on an access road, or on a driveway when the other roadway, access road, or driveway is separated from the roadway on which he is driving by a physical barrier or an unpaved area. The driver of a vehicle also need not stop when approaching a school bus which is loading or discharging passengers from or onto property immediately adjacent to a school if the driver is directed by a law-enforcement officer or other duly authorized uniformed school crossing guard to pass the school bus. This section shall apply to school buses which are equipped with warning devices prescribed in § 46.2-1090 and are painted yellow with the words “School Bus” in black letters at least eight inches high on the front and rear thereof. Only school buses which are painted yellow and equipped with the required lettering and warning devices shall be identified as school buses.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from overtaking or passing an emergency vehicle

§ 46.2-829. Approach of law-enforcement or fire-fighting vehicles, rescue vehicles, or ambulances; violation as failure to yield right-of-way – Upon the approach of any emergency vehicle as defined in § 46.2-920 giving audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or air horn designed to give automatically intermittent signals, and displaying a flashing, blinking, or alternating emergency light or lights as provided in §§ 46.2-1022 through 46.2-1024, the driver of every other vehicle shall, as quickly as traffic and other highway conditions permit, drive to the nearest edge of the roadway, clear of any intersection of highways, and stop and remain there, unless otherwise directed by a law-enforcement officer, until the emergency vehicle has passed. This provision shall not relieve the driver of any such vehicle to which the right-of-way is to be yielded of the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway, nor shall it protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of such right-of-way. Violation of this section shall constitute failure to yield the right-of-way; however, any violation of this section that involves overtaking or passing a moving emergency vehicle giving an audible signal and displaying activated warning lights as provided for in this section shall constitute reckless driving, punishable as provided in § 46.2-868.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from racing

This is one of the most serious forms of reckless driving accusations in Virginia.  If convicted of reckless driving because of racing, the court will impose a minimum driver’s license suspension of not less than six months in addition to the traditional Virginia reckless driving potential penalties such as jail time and steep Virginia reckless driving fines.

§ 46.2-865. Racing; penalty – Any person who engages in a race between two or more motor vehicles on the highways in the Commonwealth or on any driveway or premises of a church, school, recreational facility, or business property open to the public in the Commonwealth shall be guilty of reckless driving, unless authorized by the owner of the property or his agent. When any person is convicted of reckless driving under this section, in addition to any other penalties provided by law the driver’s license of such person shall be suspended by the court for a period of not less than six months nor more than two years. In case of conviction the court shall order the surrender of the license to the court where it shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of § 46.2-398.

Sometimes Virginia reckless driving charges, including those associated with racing can be reduced to improper driving, a traffic infraction.  This resolution is only available when the degree of negligence is slight.

JAMES EDWARD BAYNE
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.

Record No. 2395-04-3.

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Salem.

March 28, 2006.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of Staunton, Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Judge.

Frankie C. Coyner for appellant.

(Judith W. Jagdmann, Attorney General; Josephine F. Whalen, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.

Present: Judges Benton, Clements and Kelsey,

MEMORANDUM OPINION*

JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.

The sole issue to be decided on this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove James Edward Bayne guilty of improper driving as proscribed by Code § 46.2-869. We hold that it was.

I.

Police Officer Chad Nestor was parked in his police cruiser at approximately 11:00 p.m. when he heard a “very loud” exhaust and then noticed two cars accelerating on a city street side by side. Officer Nestor described further his initial observation:

They were both side by side as they left through the intersection when I looked up. They were accelerating — you could tell that they weren’t what you call normally pulling out of the — from the light, like a normal person would drive from the intersection. They were neck and neck going as fast — really fast going down towards downtown.

Page 2

Though he was not certain of the cars’ actual speeds, Officer Nestor believed that both cars were traveling in excess of the posted 35 miles-per-hour speed limit.

Officer Nestor followed the cars and lost sight of them as they “rounded [a] turn.” When he saw the cars again, one car had accelerated past the other. Officer Nestor testified that he had to accelerate “pretty good” to catch the cars. When he did, he directed the lead car to stop in a parking lot, continued until he caught the next car, and directed the driver of the second car to the parking lot where the other car waited. Officer Nestor obtained identifications from both drivers. James Edward Bayne was the driver of the first car Officer Nestor stopped. When he asked Bayne to explain what he was doing, Bayne said that he was “just playing around.” Officer Nestor issued a summons to Bayne for racing, a reckless driving offense in violation of Code § 46.2-865.

Bayne testified he was driving a car his brother had purchased earlier that day and he was driving it for the first time. Bayne recalled that he was traveling approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour when he approached the area where Officer Nestor was parked, but said he could not “quite remember [his speed].” He testified that he thought he slowed a bit when he saw the officer’s car and that he and the other driver, whom he denied knowing, both stopped at an intersection near the lot in which Officer Nestor was parked. Bayne denied having a loud muffler on his car and speeding away when the traffic light changed. He also denied making any statements to Officer Nestor.

The trial judge found that the two cars were moving fast down the city street “side by side,” and he accepted as true the officer’s testimony that Bayne said he was fooling around. The judge convicted Bayne of improper driving and imposed a fine.

Page 3

II.

Code § 46.2-865, the statute charged in the summons, provides in part that “[a]ny person who engages in a race between two or more motor vehicles on the highways . . . shall be guilty of reckless driving.” The statute proscribing improper driving provides as follows:

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, upon the trial of any person charged with reckless driving where the degree of culpability is slight, the court in its discretion may find the accused not guilty of reckless driving but guilty of improper driving . . . . Improper driving shall be punishable as a traffic infraction punishable by a fine of not more than $500.

Code § 46.2-869. To sustain a conviction for improper driving, the evidence must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bayne notes that “he was not charged with speeding.” He argues that Officer Nestor could not testify with certainty about the speed of the cars and, therefore, that no evidence proved his driving endangered life, limb, or property. The Commonwealth argues that the manner and circumstances in which Bayne operated the car proved he drove improperly.

Officer Nestor testified the posted speed was 35 miles per hour. He also testified that Bayne’s speed was “really fast” based on his observation of Bayne’s car and his pursuit to stop the cars.

“An estimate of the speed at which an automobile was moving at a given time is generally viewed as a matter of common observation rather than expert opinion, and it is accordingly well settled that any person of ordinary experience, ability, and intelligence having the means or opportunity of observation, whether an expert or nonexpert, and without proof of further qualification may express an opinion as to how fast an automobile which came under his observation was going at a particular time . . . . Speed of an automobile is not a matter of exclusive knowledge or skill, but anyone with a knowledge of time and distance is a competent witness to give an estimate; the opportunity and extent of observation goes to the weight of the testimony.”

Page 4

Greenway v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 147, 152, 487 S.E.2d 224, 227 (1997) (quoting Moore v. Lewis, 201 Va. 522, 525, 111 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1960) (citations omitted)).

The evidence that the trial judge accepted to be true was the officer’s testimony that the cars moved away from the traffic light “accelerating . . . neck and neck going . . . really fast.” The quality of the officer’s observations was a matter of credibility. Greenway, 254 Va. at 152, 487 S.E.2d at 227. In addition to this evidence of unusual speed by two cars accelerating from a stopped position, the evidence also proved Bayne acknowledged to the officer that he was “just playing around.”

The trial judge was not required to accept as credible Bayne’s testimony that he saw the officer’s car in the parking lot and, therefore, did not speedily drive from the traffic light or that he did not tell the officer he was engaged in frivolity with the other driver. This was a credibility determination that properly rests with the trial judge as the fact finder. Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 42, 53, 596 S.E.2d 81, 86 (2004) (holding that we defer to the fact finder’s determination that the witness’ self-serving testimony is not worthy of belief). “Where the trier of fact believes a witness has knowingly testified falsely in any material fact, he has a right to give the testimony such weight and credit as in his opinion it was entitled.” Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 469, 472, 339 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1986). The trial judge resolved the conflicts in the evidence against Bayne.

Bayne argues that the conviction was based on speculation and failed to satisfy the standard announced Bacon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 766, 263 S.E.2d 390 (1980). We disagree. In Bacon, the defendant’s explanation of the events that led to a conviction for improper driving was “not contradicted.” 220 Va. at 768, 263 S.E.2d at 391. The defendant testified that he “was forced off the highway by another vehicle . . . [and] was confronted with a sudden emergency that was not caused by his own negligence.” Id. Reversing the conviction for

Page 5

improper driving, the Supreme Court held that “the mere fact that an accident happened . . . does not give rise to an inference . . . of improper driving.” Id. at 769, 263 S.E.2d at 392. In view of the uncontradicted evidence, the conviction in Bacon was supported only by “speculat[ion] . . . that [the accident] was due to excessive speed, to inattention by the driver, or to alcohol.” Id.

In this case, however, Officer Nestor’s testimony was credible evidence that the speed at which Bayne was traveling was improper under the circumstances. The officer’s testimony of the manner in which the cars quickly accelerated from the traffic light, driving side-by-side and the evidence of Bayne’s admission of “playing around” while he was accelerating and driving beside the other car were sufficient to prove that the manner and circumstances of Bayne’s driving conduct was unsafe. See Hale v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 587, 591, 478 S.E.2d 710, 711-12 (1996) (holding that improper driving includes failure to operate a vehicle in a safe manner and under control). We hold that this evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt improper driving.

For these reasons, we affirm the conviction.

Affirmed.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from driving two abreast in a single lane

§ 46.2-857. Driving two abreast in a single lane – A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives any motor vehicle, including any motorcycle, so as to be abreast of another vehicle in a lane designed for one vehicle, or drives any motor vehicle, including any motorcycle, so as to travel abreast of any other vehicle traveling in a lane designed for one vehicle. However, this section shall not apply to any validly authorized parade, motorcade, or motorcycle escort, nor shall it apply to a motor vehicle traveling in the same lane of traffic as a bicycle, electric personal assistive mobility device, electric power-assisted bicycle, or moped.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from passing two vehicles abreast

§ 46.2-856. Passing two vehicles abreast – A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who passes or attempts to pass two other vehicles abreast, moving in the same direction, except on highways having separate roadways of three or more lanes for each direction of travel, or on designated one-way streets or highways. This section shall not apply, however, to a motor vehicle passing two other vehicles when one or both of such other vehicles is a bicycle, electric personal assistive mobility device, electric power-assisted bicycle, or moped; nor shall this section apply to a bicycle, electric personal assistive mobility device, electric power-assisted bicycle, or moped passing two other vehicles.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from failing to give proper signal

§ 46.2-860. Failing to give proper signals – A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who fails to give adequate and timely signals of intention to turn, partly turn, slow down, or stop, as required by Article 6 (§ 46.2-848 et seq.) of this chapter.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from failure to yield right of way when entering highway

§ 46.2-863. Failure to yield right-of-way – A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who fails to bring his vehicle to a stop immediately before entering a highway from a side road when there is traffic approaching on such highway within 500 feet of such point of entrance, unless (i) a “Yield Right-of-Way” sign is posted or (ii) where such sign is posted, fails, upon entering such highway, to yield the right-of-way to the driver of a vehicle approaching on such highway from either direction.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from an overloaded vehicle as to obstruct or interfere with the driver’s control

§ 46.2-855. Driving with driver’s view obstructed or control impaired – A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives a vehicle when it is so loaded, or when there are in the front seat such number of persons, as to obstruct the view of the driver to the front or sides of the vehicle or to interfere with the driver’s control over the driving mechanism of the vehicle.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from passing another vehicle at a railroad grade crossing

§ 46.2-858. Passing at a railroad grade crossing – A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who overtakes or passes any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any railroad grade crossing or at any intersection of highways unless such vehicles are being operated on a highway having two or more designated lanes of roadway for each direction of travel or unless such intersection is designated and marked as a passing zone or on a designated one-way street or highway, or while pedestrians are passing or about to pass in front of either of such vehicles, unless permitted so to do by a traffic light or law-enforcement officer.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from driving too fast for traffic conditions

§ 46.2-861. Driving too fast for highway and traffic conditions – A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who exceeds a reasonable speed under the circumstances and traffic conditions existing at the time, regardless of any posted speed limit.

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Virginia reckless driving charges resulting from improper brakes or a vehicle not under proper control

§ 46.2-853. Driving vehicle which is not under control; faulty brakes – A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives a vehicle which is not under proper control or which has inadequate or improperly adjusted brakes on any highway in the Commonwealth.

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Our Virginia reckless driving attorneys have handled hundreds of reckless driving tickets in Virginia.  We have an impressive track record of accomplishment in reckless driving ticket defense and can provide you with representation.

Contact a Virginia reckless driving attorney.


Virginia (VA) criminal defense, divorce, child custody, reckless driving, dui and federal court attorneyrepresenting clients throughout Virginia. Some of the jurisdictions served include:

Henrico County VA, Richmond City, Chesterfield County VA, Hanover County VA, Petersburg County VA, Fairfax County, Prince William County, Hopewell, Petersburg, Dinwiddie, Quantico, Virginia Beach VA, Norfolk, Chesapeake, Fredericksburg, Stafford, Spotsylvania VA, Hampton Roads, Newport News, Hampton, Williamsburg, Amelia, Powhatan, Goochland, Louisa, Manassas VA, Woodbridge, Charles City, James City, Gloucester, Tidewater, Portsmouth, Shenandoah, Prince George, Sussex, New Kent, West End of Richmond, Glen Allen, Federal Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Richmond, Alexandria, Norfolk, and Newport News Divisions).

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